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Abstract 
 
This thesis confronts symptoms of an issue which is eroding at the principles of 
conservative advocacy, specifically those dealing with federalism. It contrasts modern 
definitions of federalism with those which existed in the late 1700s, and then attempts to 
determine the cause of the change. Concluding that the change was caused by a shift in 
American political identity, the author argues that the conservative movement must begin 
a conversation on how best to adapt to the change to prevent further drifting away from 
conservative principles. 
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A Study in Sovereignty: 
Federalism, Political Culture, and the Future of Conservatism 
On January 29, 2018, the United States Senate held a cloture vote to end a 
filibuster of S. 2311, also known as the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. The 
act, sponsored by Senator Lindsey Graham, would prohibited almost all abortions after 
the 20th week of pregnancy; the bill failed to reach the 60-vote threshold necessary to end 
the filibuster.1 In a matter of days, a storm of outrage howled across social media. 
“Resistance is Appalling and Indefensible,” exclaimed the National Review, calling 
opposition to the bill “another indication of how radical today’s Democratic party has 
become on abortion.” 2,3 A Catholic priest called for excommunications of the 14 
Catholic-denomination Senators who voted against the legislation.4 Senator Ted Cruz 
accused Democrats of “neglecting their moral responsibility,” and stated that the 
legislation was “crucial in the fight for human dignity.”5 Even Senator Rand Paul, known 
                                            
1 Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, S. 2311, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional 
Record, Vol. 164, daily ed. (Jan. 16, 2018): S187. 
2 Kathryn Jean Lopez, “20 Week Abortion Ban – Resistance is Appalling and Indefensible,” 
National Review, February 5, 2018, accessed February 6, 2018, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/456096/abortion-20-week-ban-resistance-appalling-indefensible. 
3 Alexandra DeSanctis, “Senate Fails to Pass 20-Week Abortion Ban,” National Review, January 
29, 2018, accessed February 6, 2018, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/455883/abortion-ban-senate-
vote-fails-pass-pain-capable-unborn-child-protection-act. 
4 Lisa Bourne, “Priest Calls for Excommunication of 14 Catholic Senators Who Voted Against 
Late-Term Abortion Ban,” LifeSite, February 5, 2018, accessed February 6, 2018, 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/priest-calls-for-excommunication-of-14-catholic-senators-who-voted-
against. 
5 “Sen. Cruz Issues Statement on Senate Democrats’ Filibuster of the Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act,” January 29, 2018, accessed February 6, 2018, 
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3611. 
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for his incredibly libertarian views, condemned those who voted against the bill, stating 
on Twitter that “I believe there will be a time when we are judged by whether or not we 
stood up for life.”6  
Of course, there’s just one minor problem. Nowhere does the Constitution give 
the national government jurisdiction to outlaw and/or punish abortion, murder, or any 
other related crime. Of course, that hasn’t stopped Congress from prohibiting drugs, and 
workplace harassment, and a whole host of other law enforcement items that they have 
no power to regulate. Usually there is an argument based on the Commerce Clause, the 
General Welfare Clause, or some other constitutional provision.  
In most of those situations, there are political advocates who call the national 
government out on its abuse of power. More often than not, those advocates are 
conservative or libertarian. Even more frequently, they fall into the “strict 
constructionist” camp of conservatism. But amid the outcry over S. 2311, a major 
question was passed over. Why did Senators Cruz and Paul, both so outspokenly 
dedicated to restraining the government within its Constitutional boundaries, become so 
vehement in declaring a “moral responsibility” to overstep those very same 
Constitutional boundaries? This points to a change in the way that all persons in the 
United States approach the idea of Constitutional federalism—a shift that has altered 
every man’s belief about distributing power between the States and the national 
government. It has affected even the staunchest of strict constructionists, undermining 
                                            
6 Rand Paul, Twitter post, January 30, 2018 (5:50 a.m.), accessed February 6, 2018, 
https://twitter.com/RandPaul. 
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both the message and the means of conservative advocacy and activism. Unaddressed, 
this change will finish eroding conservative principles entirely. However, by tracing the 
substance and cause of the change, a path forward may yet be discovered. Conservatism 
may not be able to look exactly as it did forty years ago. However, if the appropriate 
action is taken, the core values of conservatism may still be preserved for the decades to 
come. 
Part I: Federalism 
What is meant by the term federalism? Modern political philosophers disagree 
over the specifics details, but there is a common general concept of layered government. 
Different theories diverge when they look at the specifics of those layers—specifics 
ranging from the practical application of the theory to the historical purpose behind 
creating it. To even begin unravelling the tangled debate surrounding federalism, there 
are at least three major questions that must be answered. How was federalism understood 
in 1787? What is meant by the term now? What has changed—and, most importantly, 
why? 
Foundations of Federalism 
 The theory of federalism has its historical origins in debates over sovereignty. 
This is not entirely surprising, as the very nature of federalism is concerned with 
sovereignty. For over 200 years, the word “sovereignty” has referred to “supreme 
controlling power…absolute and independent authority.”7 There are two prongs to this 
                                            
7 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “sovereignty,” accessed February 6, 2018, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/185343?. 
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definition—absoluteness and independence. If either of those is lacking, then the 
government is not truly supreme—and, therefore, not truly sovereign. Under the 
historical English common law, this “supreme authority” was given to Parliament—
constrained, of course, by boundaries set forth by the law of God, who was sovereign 
over all. Thus, while Parliament was considered the absolute authority in England, it 
could not just pass a law condemning a specific innocent man to death. On the other 
hand, though, it was not enough for a sovereign power to be absolute. It must also be 
independent—i.e., free of any sort of interference in its own affairs. This criterion refers 
to what the great jurist William Blackstone referred to as Imperium in Imperio—loosely 
translated as “dominion within dominion.” Developed to explain why the Pope could not 
claim civil authority within England, this concept dictated that one distinct governing 
body within another was practically impossible. As one writer explains, “Multiple 
sources of authority could not share the same political space. Where multiple authorities 
did appear to exist…one of the seeming authorities actually derived its entire power from 
the other and therefore was neither independent nor…genuine.”8 Of course, this 
interlinkage between sovereignty and federalism has multiple implications. Most notably, 
it distinguishes federalism from decentralization. A federal government is often 
decentralized; however, decentralization does not create federalism.9 
                                            
8 Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 14. 
9 Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, “Federalism and Interpretation,” Publius, Vol. 38, No. 2 
(Spring, 2008): p 171-172, accessed August 9, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20184965. 
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 The other implication is that the question of federalism is ultimately one of 
sovereignty. If federalism consists of “layers of government,” and sovereignty can only 
exist in one governing body, then where does it exist in America? Alexander Hamilton 
seemed to alternate between placing it in the central government in general and the courts 
in particular. Some have placed it in the Constitution, citing the Supremacy Clause. 
Samuel Rubin laid it in the hands of the people as a national democracy, while John C. 
Calhoun declared that it was in the hands of the individual States. Each of these would 
follow his belief in sovereignty and arrive at a different theory of federalism. If 
sovereignty cannot be divided, then where is it?  
 The answer for that was first articulated in America by the Massachusetts 
Executive Council in response to Governor Thomas Hutchinson in 1773. Hutchinson had 
earlier addressed the Council and argued that Parliament was the sovereign government 
and the colonies were subordinate governments. The Council responded that the 
treatment of the subordinate government as a separate entity implied that there were areas 
over which Parliament was not sovereign. “If the subordinate power were not 
independently constituted, then it would not need to be denominated a subordinate 
power; instead it would be a subset of the supreme power.”10 The Council concluded by 
arguing that, within the colonial system, sovereignty was not determined by territory. 
Rather, it was defined by subject matter. “The two Powers are not incompatible, and do 
subsist together, each restraining its Acts to their Constitutional Objects.”11 This was the 
                                            
10 LaCroix, Origins, 94. 
11 Ibid., 94-95. 
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first glimpse of a federalist system—a system that actually did divide sovereignty. Now it 
remains to be seen if that concept has remained true throughout the life of this Country. 
Federalism in 1787 
Political thinkers are conflicted about the meaning of federalism even today—
how much more so do they disagree about what it meant over two centuries ago! 
However, most of these thinkers and historians do tend to share one thing in common—
there is a tendency to impose current definitions of federalism upon the historical 
backdrop of the debates. Of these, there are two views which are incredibly popular, and 
a third which seems to be the most accurate. Ultimately, the difference between each of 
them is where sovereignty is placed. 
The first view is referred to by Constitutional scholar Samuel H. Beer as compact 
federalism. This federalism places sovereignty within the governments of the individual 
states, and was supported by John C. Calhoun, a Senator from South Carolina who later 
served as Andrew Jackson’s vice president.12,13 Calhoun supported South Carolina during 
the famous “Nullification Crisis” of Jackson’s first term, during which South Carolina 
threatened to nullify a federal tariff bill and Jackson threatened military action if the state 
did not comply. In part because of this, Calhoun became known as an ardent supporter of 
States’ rights. This theory is not merely supported by the Anti-Federalists, however; there 
have been multiple authors in more recent days that Beer has accused of agreeing with 
                                            
12 Samuel H. Beer, “Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America,” The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Mar. 1978), p. 12, accessed August 9, 2017. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953596. 
13 Samuel H. Beer, “Responses to Rubin and Feeley,” Publius, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 2008): p. 
196, accessed August 9, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20184966. 
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it.14 The problem with this theory is that if all sovereign power is given to the individual 
states, then there is nothing left for the national government to wield sovereignty over.  
Beer himself is a proponent of the second major theory, which he calls national 
federalism. As the cornerstone of his argument, Beer quotes Abraham Lincoln’s address 
to Congress on July 4, 1861. “Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and, 
in turn…the Union made them States…The Union is older than any of the States, and, in 
fact, it created them as States.”15 Sovereignty, according to Beer, existed at neither the 
state nor the national levels under the Constitution—rather, it rested in the people 
themselves as a nation.16 As a result, he argues, the Founders instituted federalism as “an 
instrument of national democracy.”17 Ironically, this itself has far more in common with 
the Anti-federalists than it does with the Federalist point of view.18 One major issue with 
Beer’s theory is that he refuses to distinguish between a federal government and a 
decentralized one. He states that the definition of American federalism is that 
“decentralization is constitutional, not merely statutory.”19 The implication is that if 
people wish to abolish federalism, then they are perfectly free to do so, and there is no 
absolute legal or moral reason for them not to do so. Of course, there is one other 
                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1993), 13. 
16 Beer, “Democracy in America,” 12. 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 63-
65. 
19 Beer, To Make a Nation, 23. 
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disturbing implication. If sovereignty is invested in the people as a nation, then the nation 
as a whole has the authority to single out one state and dictate how that state can govern 
any one of its own affairs, notwithstanding all constitutional and legal provisions to the 
contrary—a state of affairs which goes against the very nature of our system. 
Most authors seem to hold to either one or the other of these theories. While either 
of them might describe a modern theory of federalism, neither of them satisfactorily 
explains the mindset of the Founders. However, historian Alison LaCroix offered a third 
theory—specifically, she contends that the theory of federalism advanced by the 
Massachusetts Executive Council was refined and then adopted by the Founders in the 
Constitution. Rather than federalism being just layers of autonomy, LaCroix uses 
historical documentation—and the history of federalist thought in America—to argue that 
the Founders actually defined federalism as layers of sovereignty. Federalism was the 
result of a dialogue spanning more than a decade, in which various persons proffered 
theories on how to divide sovereignty.20 Eventually, a language of external vs. internal 
powers began to develop. Essentially, the Founders divided government jurisdictions 
according to subject matter—some things were internal, concerning only the states 
themselves; others were external, and affected all the states collectively.  
The truth of this theory can be drawn out as well from an examination of the 
debates surrounding the adoption and ratification of the Constitution itself. During the 
Constitutional Convention, there were three proposed plans, none of which matched this 
original confederation idea. The New York Plan, proposed by Alexander Hamilton, 
                                            
20 LaCroix, Origins, 59-64. 
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favored a single national legislature with complete sovereignty and authority.21 The New 
Jersey Plan, on the other hand, sought to preserve as much of the original Articles of 
Confederation as possible, and envisioned a system where the states retained ultimate 
sovereignty, but granted tightly limited revenue-collecting abilities to a coordinating 
authority.22 In between these two lay the Virginia Plan, which granted a vast and 
extremely diverse array of powers to the central government.23 Under the Virginia Plan, 
“the several states would have been converted into little more than provinces directed by 
a central government.”24 The end product was a middle ground between the New Jersey 
and Virginia Plans.25 
We know from the results of the Convention that, at least in the 1780s, federalism 
did not mean a unified government like Hamilton proposed. We also, however, know that 
it did not mean a government similar to the Articles of Confederation. Nevertheless, if 
Samuel Beer was correct and federalism was in fact a “vehicle for national democracy,” 
then the influence of the New Jersey plan remains unexplained. At the same time, States 
did not give up their identity when the Constitution was ratified. One the few occasions 
when the “United States” are referred to using a pronoun in the Constitution, it is with the 
                                            
21 James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), 
259-260. 
22 Ibid., 262-263. 
23 Ibid., 257-259. 
24 Ibid., 258-259. 
25 Ibid., 263-265. 
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plural pronoun “they.”26, 27, 28 “We the People” did not re-write the meaning of statehood 
when the Constitution was ratified. As a result, there was no “nation” that somehow re-
constituted the states. The question, then, is whether the states drew their power from the 
national Constitution or their own state documents.  
When examining the historical record, it becomes clear that this was not the case. 
One of the common misconceptions surrounding the ratification debate is that the Anti-
Federalists supported a small central government while the Federalists favored a large 
central government. The truth, however, is that the debate was never about how much 
coercive authority the central government should have. Instead, it was about whether a 
central government should have any coercive authority at all. In other words, it was a 
question of whether sovereignty was to remain with the States or be divided between the 
state and the national government. The Federalists argued that the national level need 
some measure of sovereignty to force cooperation between the states. At the same time, 
though, they agreed that this power ought only to exist for those few things that the states 
could not accomplish on their own. Madison writes in the Federalist No. 14, “Its 
jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of 
the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The 
subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects…will 
                                            
26 US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 8. 
27 US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1, cl. 8. (This passage is particularly insightful because it contrasts 
“the United States” with “any [one] of them.”) 
28 US Constitution, art. 3, sec. 3, cl. 1. 
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retain their due authority and activity.”29 Even the Anti-federalists acknowledged this. In 
the 17th Anti-federalist paper, “Brutus” acknowledged, “It is true this government is 
limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is still 
left to the States.”30 In reality, as one modern scholar writes, the potential elasticity of the 
Constitution, while “by no means the only objection raised by opponents…was clearly 
one of their primary concerns.”31 The Anti-federalist objection was not that the 
Constitution granted too much power in the present. Rather, the Anti-federalists argued, 
the Constitution could be twisted to grant more power in the future.  
At the end of Federalist No. 39, Madison lists the ways in which the government 
was national and the ways in which it was federal. In only one way was it not federal: 
namely, in the operation of its powers. In other words, it did not rely upon the states to 
enforce its mandates. In every other way, Madison points out, the government did not 
draw its power from the people directly, but from the people as organized by States.32 
This cuts against both the compact and national theories of federalism. Because the 
power rises from the States, it cannot come from simply a “national democracy,” nor 
                                            
29 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 14,” Federalist Papers (Great Neck Publishing) (January 
5, 2009), Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed August 9, 2017). 
30 Brutus, “Antifederalist Paper 17,” The Federalist Papers Project, accessed August 9, 2017, 
http://thefederalistpapers.org/antifederalist-paper-17. 
31 Andrew C. Lenner, “John Taylor and the Origins of American Federalism,” Journal of the Early 
Republic 17, no. 3 (Fall, 1997): 402. 
32 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 39,” Federalist Papers (Great Neck Publishing) (January 
5, 2009), Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed August 9, 2017). 
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could state autonomy be “granted” by a central authority.33, 34 Federalism, as envisioned 
by the Founders, was a layered form of government. However, as Madison stated, a 
federal government leaves all jurisdictions subject to the authority of the separate parts, 
except for “certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic.”35 
From this, then, a final definition can be drawn—the overriding principle that made 
federalism unique among governments. Federalism is a layered government formed by 
sovereign political entities. These entities grant limited sovereign jurisdiction to a central 
authority, but only over those areas which cannot be effectively governed by the 
individual entities themselves. In other words, it grants sovereignty over external affairs 
to the central government, while retaining sovereignty over internal affairs for the States. 
This is the same definition that LaCroix arrived at, drawn froth from the primary source 
documents themselves. 
Federalism in the Modern Era 
To determine what has changed since 1787, it is necessary to examine what is 
meant by federalism now. Once again, the two main theories differ principally in where 
the full sovereignty is placed. The first theory places more of an emphasis on the role of 
the central government, while the second places all sovereignty in the hands of the people 
as a third party supervising the branches of government. 
                                            
33 Samuel H. Beer, “Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America,” The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Mar. 1978), p. 9, accessed August 9, 2017. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953596. 
34 Rubin and Feeley, “Federalism and Interpretation,” 177. 
35 Madison, “Federalist No. 39.” 
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The first theory was elaborated upon by Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley in 
2008. Arguing that federalism was derived from a “dual political identity” that exists at 
both the national and state levels, Rubin and Feeley define federalism as “a mode of 
organizing a political entity that grants partial autonomy to geographically defined 
subdivisions of the polity.”36 It is worth noting that this definition, although claiming to 
be an exhaustive “general theory of federalism,” does not claim to be federalism as the 
Founders used the term. Rather, Rubin and Feeley state, it is federalism “as the term is 
used in [current] political science and legal scholarship.”37 They do, however, make clear 
that a federal state “lies somewhere between a fully unitary state…that is governed by a 
single central government… [and] an alliance that precludes conflict…but leaves all 
other decisions under the control of the separate entities.”38 This theory is somewhat 
similar to LaCroix’s description of the Founders’ federalism, but it does not quite reach 
the whole way. A federalist state is not a government with layered sovereignty; rather, it 
is a “single political entity with partially autonomous regions.”39  
While Samuel Beer agreed with their account of “modern federalism,” he argued 
that it was nowhere near the federalism that was implemented in America. He writes:  
My fundamental disagreement…is with [their] definition of 
federalism…What I am thinking of is the concept of federalism which, 
                                            
36 Rubin and Feeley, “Federalism and Interpretation,” 170. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
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although not without serious competitors, dominated the foundation and 
development of the USA…I lay out the national theory of 
federalism…that both the levels of government, federal and state, owe 
their authority to and were created by the ultimate sovereign power, the 
People of the United States.40 
Beer contends that federalism arose as a national movement, and that the People gave rise 
to the states and the national government simultaneously. In support of this, he quotes 
Abraham Lincoln, “The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them 
as States.”41 In Samuel Beer’s “national” theory of federalism, the Founders never 
intended for any sort of state autonomy or sovereignty at all. This becomes clear when he 
claims that Rubin and Feeley’s conception of federalism is fundamentally like “the 
formal rhetoric of the Articles [of confederation].”42 Calling this the “compact theory” of 
federalism, he states, “In competition with the national theory, the compact theory was 
championed by the anti-federalists…Rejecting the preamble, they claimed it should read 
‘We, the States...’ not ‘We, the People.’”43  
The truth is, however, that there is very little that Rubin and Feeley have in 
common with the Anti-federalists, who rejected entirely the idea of a central government 
at all. On the contrary, their assertion is that the autonomy of various geographical 
                                            
40 Beer, “Responses,”195. 
41 Ibid., 196. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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subdivision is only partial, and that they are still subordinate to the central government.44 
They also go to great lengths to differentiate federalism from decentralization. The 
difference, they argue, is not so much the concept of layered government. Rather, it is 
that “in a federal regime, there are some decisions that the center cannot override, 
although, depending on specific circumstances, it may be able to influence the decision 
by threat or by inducement.”45 Beer has no such qualms about combining the two 
concepts, even going so far as to call federalism constitutional decentralization.46 In the 
end, however, regardless of their disagreements, both theories agree on one thing. 
Autonomy is partial, its limits are defined by the will of a people or sovereign power 
rather than by an overarching legal principle, and the “subordinate” governments are not 
granted true independence from the central authority. 
Part II: Changes in Federalism 
 Just by comparing Rubin, Feeley, and Beer’s theories with the paradigm advanced 
by LaCroix, it is apparent that something has changed in how academia looks at 
federalism. More importantly, the fact that this appears to be accepted in the mainstream 
almost without opposition implies that something else is at work as well, influencing a 
shift in how people think of the nation. By examining both what changed and why it 
shifted, it should be possible to determine the implications of the shift. 
A Change in Political Systems 
                                            
44 Rubin and Feeley, “Federalism and Interpretation,” 170. 
45 Ibid., 172. 
46 Beer, To Make a Nation, 23. 
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Although Rubin, Feeley, and Beer have done a decent job of summarizing modern 
views of federalism, their descriptions only drive home the fact that today’s government 
is not federal—it is only decentralized. Rubin and Feeley are fairly close to the mark of 
the early United States as presented by LaCroix. At the same time, however, the most 
enlightening portion of their discussion is the section contrasting federalism with 
decentralization. They write that federalism may be highly decentralized, 
“decentralization does not necessarily lead to federalism.”47 Their rationale is that a 
decentralized state may, by an act of legislation, become centralized again. This, 
ironically, roughly equates what Beer’s definition of federalism as decentralization that is 
constitutional instead of statutory. Ultimately, their disagreement with Beer is rooted in 
the fact that they believe federalism can arise in a collection of states which do not 
already consider themselves a nation. Beer disagrees, and instead argues that it was a 
decision by the people as a nation to reconstitute themselves as a federal government with 
multiple layers of power. The real difference between federalism and decentralization lies 
in how each system treats sovereignty. Federalism divides sovereignty between the states 
and the central government. Under decentralization, however, all sovereignty is given to 
the central government (or, in Beer’s case, the nation of people); that government then 
decides which level should possess which authority. The rebranding of the “central 
government” to a “national democracy” is a shell game, made obvious when Beer 
replaces a “statute” with a “constitution.” Other than the method of passage, there is but 
little difference. 
                                            
47 Rubin and Feeley, “Federalism and Interpretation,” 172. 
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It is evident based off LaCroix’s work, combined with original sources, that there 
was no “national democracy” in 1787. There was no decision to “reconstitute” the States. 
If anything, it was assumed that the states should and would continue to exist under the 
new Constitution as they ever had—as governments wielding sovereign powers. When 
examining Madison’s notes on the Convention, there is a rather telling detail. When 
Hamilton’s New York plan was debated and then rejected, there is a distinct lack of 
elaboration on why getting rid of the states was bad. Opponents simply stated that it 
abolished the states in favor of a British-style monarchy, and left it at that. 48 
Nor was there any dual identity, save perhaps that which was created by the 
Constitution itself. Of course, perhaps there was some lingering sense of commonality 
that made the colonists willing to work with each other in some fashion, forged by the 
common empire they had been a part of and fought together to leave. However, the 
ultimate problem with the Articles of Confederation was that no State would abide by 
their obligation—a problem that would have been less prevalent if some sort of national 
identity had co-existed with the state identity.49 The federal system was necessary 
because cooperation was necessary, but had not been attained. For that same reason, we 
know that there was no sense of “national democracy.” Perhaps there was such a sense 
unvoiced among the Anti-Federalists, although that seems unlikely given their opposition 
to a national government of any stripe. Among the Federalists, there was never such a 
                                            
48 James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the Constitution of 
the United States of America, ed. Gaillard Hunt and James Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1920), 111-120, 139. 
49 Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 1932, Reprint 
(Union, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2002), 151. 
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murmur. Certainly, the Virginia Plan had originally proposed an incredibly strong central 
government. However, the document which emerged from the Constitutional Convention, 
with its distinct undemocratic nature, belies Beer’s assertion that it was meant as a 
statement of nationality. If anything, it concentrated an overly large amount of power in 
the states—and the necessity for a bicameral legislature to protect small states from large 
ones, and vice versa, does little to help his case. 
The truth is that Samuel Beer does a very excellent job of describing today’s 
American government, and the way that most people believe it works. Unfortunately, the 
truth is also that said American government is no longer a Federalist government. It is, as 
Beer states, a “constitutionally decentralized” government.50 If federalism is ultimately a 
system of divided sovereignty, then it only exists if there is a system of strictly divided 
sovereign jurisdictions—jurisdictions that are, by definition, completely independent of 
each other. There is no reliance by the states upon the national government to accomplish 
their duties. Instead, there is now a constant interlinkage of authorities.51 It is almost 
impossible to avoid interacting with both state and federal regulations on any subject 
issue. Rubin and Feeley also demonstrate the failure of their definition to measure up 
when they declare that in a federal government, the central branch could attempt to 
influence the actions of certain autonomous branches.52 Such a government is not made 
up of independent sovereign authorities. Thus, while it may be decentralized, it is no 
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longer federal. All sovereignty, either in name or in fact, has been placed in the hands of 
a national government. 
This change has major implications. The changed definition of federalism has 
caused confusion, both in terms of what the Constitution means now and what it meant 
then. Additionally, if the definition of federalism was altered in this manner, it would 
result—and indeed, has resulted—in an increasing blurring of the lines between state and 
national authority. Where such blurring occurs, it is almost inevitable that the national 
government, with its vastly superior resources, would end up on the better end of the 
exchange. A change in the definition does not happen in a vacuum, however; and the 
cause of change has its own implications to consider. These implications include (but are 
not limited to) dictating both why a response is necessary, and what form that response 
ought to take. To discern the answers to those questions, some elaboration on the cause of 
change is required. 
A Change in Political Culture 
Ultimately, all signs point to a change in political culture as the guilty culprit in 
causing the alteration in federal concepts. The link between culture and federalism was 
suggested by Rubin and Feely, but they were hardly the first ones to suggest that a 
progression in cultural identity was influential. By examining the political culture of the 
colonial period and comparing it to the culture of today, parallels begin to emerge. At the 
very least there is correlation; the leap from correlation to causation is not a very difficult 
one to make. 
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Political identity in 1787. In the days of the early Constitution, political identities 
were very much wrapped up in the notion of Statehood. One need only look at the 
rhetoric of Patrick Henry to see a prime example of the suspicion that existed between the 
different states. Of course, one could allege that the famous Virginian statesman was an 
outlier; however, the strife between large and small states at the Constitutional 
Convention is also very suggestive. If there was actually interest in a nation, then why 
was New York hesitant to give small states equal representation? And why were small 
states afraid that larger states would use a populous House of Representatives to outvote 
New Jersey interests?53 Political identities were also evident in the attitude of various 
statesmen towards the concept of state sovereignty. That the existence of the individual 
states within the union was a good thing was hardly ever called into question. In fact, 
even though the Federalists did believe that vesting force in the hands of the central 
government was necessary, it was taken for granted by many that the central government 
should be one of limited jurisdiction.54  
This had a direct bearing on the adoption of federalism. Essentially, a collection 
of nation-states agreed to become a nation of states, and divided sovereignty strictly 
according to internal and external powers. This was, in many ways, necessitated by the 
fact that people identified as members of their state first, and as members of the nation 
only second. If government action was morally necessary, there was a sense in most 
places that such action ought to take place at the state level. 
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Political identity in the mid-1800s. By the time of the Civil War, this attitude 
was beginning to shift. Daniel Webster and Abraham Lincoln, for instance, saw the 
Union as a nation, rather than a federal system. Lincoln was technically correct when he 
stated that the Union created the States—provided that he was referring to their official 
status “States” rather than “Territories” or “governments.” However, under the Northwest 
Ordinance, a functioning constitution drafted by the citizens of that state was a 
prerequisite for statehood.55 The Congress did not prescribe the powers of each state—the 
state prescribed its powers for itself. This, too, speaks to the way that people identified by 
state.  
Of course, one challenge to the aforementioned view of Lincoln (i.e., the belief 
that he was very much a nationalist) was his beliefs on the issue of slavery. Even though 
Lincoln did believe (and articulated quite frequently during his debates with Stephen 
Douglas) that a moral imperative existed against slavery, he did not believe that the 
national government had the authority to invoke that imperative. On September 17, 1859, 
Lincoln told his audience that “I think Slavery is wrong, morally, and politically. I desire 
that it should be no further spread in these United States, and I should not object if it 
should gradually terminate in the whole Union…[but] I say that we must not interfere 
with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists, because the constitution forbids 
it.”56 The Emancipation Proclamation did not contradict that belief—it was a wartime 
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proclamation which only affected rebellious states, and thus technically was an exertion 
of external authority. Even when the 13th Amendment was passed and ratified, it was 
ratified by States and applied by States. There was action on a national scale; however, 
that action was applied in and through the States. 
Political identity in the early 1900s. American political identity had most 
definitely completed its change by the early 1900s, with the arrival of the Progressive 
Reform movement. Perhaps the greatest example of the change in political identity was 
the success of the Prohibition movement, which abolished alcohol—an exertion over 
purely internal matters—on a national scale on moral grounds. The use of moral 
arguments is key, as a moral argument for government action is grounded on identifying 
with that government. A moral argument for action by the national government only 
succeeds if a person believes that national government is morally obligated to act. The 
national government is only morally obligated to act on an internal matter if, for some 
reason, a person has ceased to think in terms of internal and external authority. Under 
such conditions, everything is now internal because everything is now one nation by 
identity, and no longer just by law. 
Cultural changes impacting political identity. One last portion of the inquiry 
remains, and that is to ask what the cause of the cultural change was. There are several 
possible answers, and yet only a handful are convincing. In the end, the change is most 
likely due to technological advancements such as the railroad, the telegraph, and the 
telephone—advancements which drove Americans to see themselves as part of a larger 
world 
STUDY IN SOVEREIGNTY  26 
There is, perhaps, some possibility that the Civil War was responsible for the shift 
in cultural identity. After all, was not the entire war about “preserving the Union”? 
However, a war cannot cause a shift in cultural thinking; it can at best perhaps accelerate 
an already existing idea. The fact that people were willing to fight in the Civil War 
indicates that the change may have started by then, but the War itself could not have been 
the cause of it. 
It might also be argued that the massive immigration waves of the late 1800s were 
to blame. There are two diverging but similar arguments that bear some potential here. 
The first theory would claim that the immigrants themselves brought with them a 
different view of the United States. After all, the “Land of Promise” for immigrants was 
not “New York.” It was “America.” They came to the nation of America, and that was 
how they identified politically. There are two issues with this theory. The first issue is 
that while most immigrants may have come to America, that in and of itself may not be 
the decisive factor in their political identity. The second (and even more substantial) issue 
is that the Progressive Reform movement was decisively anti-immigrant, and therefore it 
seems unlikely that its followers would have been influenced by immigrant cultural 
and/or political identities. The second theory also argues that the waves of immigrants 
spurred the formation of a national identity, but reasons that (ironically) are precisely the 
opposite of the first theory. Essentially, by causing an anti-immigrant reaction by the 
Populist movement, it is distinctly possible that the immigration wave caused a wave of 
American nationalism as a reactionary force. This possibility seems to have some merit at 
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least, as the Progressive Reform movement certainly reacted to immigration.57 A wave of 
“foreigners” may very well have helped consolidate many current residents into 
embracing an identity as “current Americans” by encouraging an “us-versus-them” 
mentality. 
The third cultural phenomenon responsible for the shift was the “shrinking” of the 
world. One historian wrote in 1932, “[American] nationalism is the product of the 
railroad, the telegraph, the telephone, and all other instruments by which men 
are…merged into a common mass.”58 Additionally, this process began slightly before the 
Civil War, and was in full swing during the post-war period; thus, the time necessary for 
the change in mindset to accrue would certainly be sufficient to explain such a drastic 
shift from a state-centered identity to a national identity. The immigration wave may have 
proved a final straw prompting the Progressive Reform movement to be bold in 
proclaiming a national identity; however, Americans had discovered they were part of a 
larger world prior to that. Theodore Roosevelt’s “White Fleet” and his role as a peace-
broker between Russia and Japan were simply examples of America beginning to move 
about on the world stage. As Americans began looking beyond their neighborhood fences 
to see the world around them, they would begin to find more common ground with their 
fellow Americans—and, as a result, they started embracing an “American” identity. This 
                                            
57 “Progressivism,” in Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History, ed. Andrew W. Robertson 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 1500-1505, accessed February 7, 2018, doi: 
10.4135/9781608712380.n413. 
58 McLaughlin, 146. 
STUDY IN SOVEREIGNTY  28 
identity would both encourage and be encouraged by an “us-versus-them” reaction to the 
immigration waves of the 1890s and beyond. 
There is a definite correlation between the shift in culture, the shift of political 
identity, and the shift in the meaning of federalism. Even as the progressive reform 
movement began arguing for moral reform, the lines between state and national 
jurisdictions began to blur. The 14th Amendment, which expanded the potential for 
national interference in areas of previously independent state sovereignty, is one 
indication of changing attitudes. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which allowed to 
government to begin regulating banking activities that did not involve interstate 
commerce, is yet another. The argument for causation is also furthered by the fact that if 
government’s power comes from consent of the governed, then a change from state to 
national political identities on a large scale would ultimately change the way that people 
expect their government to function. In the same way that people of 1787 expected their 
government to maintain state sovereignty, people of 1913 expected the national 
government to step in.  
Part III: The Implications for Modern Conservatism 
How ought conservatism to react to these changes? The movement cannot simply 
sit by idly and do what it has always done. Organizations look back with nostalgia at the 
1780s and the separation of powers that went along with it. Can that separation be 
regained apart from the cultural divisions between states? Should it be? 
These questions, when answered, will help determine how conservatism ought to 
respond—and the truth is, respond it must! The movement cannot afford to ignore this 
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change as if it was of no consequence, for it has had an impact upon conservative 
political thought at its core. When the strictest of constitutional constructionists call for 
an overstepping of constitutional authority as Senators Cruz and Paul did on January 29, 
2018, there can be little question that the political identities of conservatives have 
changed along with the rest of the country. A person’s political identity matters because it 
impacts core assumptions regarding the moral obligations of government. Ordinarily, if a 
government has a moral obligation to act, there is little question of whether it should act.  
However, a unique dilemma exists in a federal system. At what level does that 
obligation to act exist? When considering this question explicitly in a forum, a thoughtful 
conservative may perhaps be able to remember that all powers not delegated to the 
national government exist at the state level. Unfortunately, most of the time when it 
matters the most this question will never be explicitly discussed. Instead, it exists only as 
a presupposition; worse, where such a presupposition exists, the answer is not provided 
by intellect or logic. Instead, it is provided by that sense of political identity which in 
1787 caused the Founders to assume that the existence of the states was a non-negotiable. 
This has resulted in a tendency to seek national solutions to problems, even within the 
conservative movement. Attempts to pass a national “marriage amendment” is one such 
example; the recent “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act” is another. Conservatives 
everywhere were outraged that the Senate refused to protect the lives of the unborn from 
murder. However, under the Constitution, murder is not a national offense. It is a purely 
internal matter. Of course, overturning Roe v. Wade is something that must be done. 
However, the solution is not, and never could be, national legislation which prohibits 
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abortion—only legislation which repeals that flawed Court decision and allows the states 
to prohibit it. This is merely one example of how a national political identity has altered 
the conservative movement—and why the conservative movement must do something to 
address it. We have lost the concept of divided sovereignty; we have blindly replaced it 
with a decentralized nation and called it federalism. Some response is desperately 
required. 
There are, in the end, three general categories into which a response to this 
changed identity could take. Conservatism can either attempt to reverse the national 
political identity, adapt to accommodate it while still remaining true to federalist 
principles, or embrace it. 
There is no question that embracing the change would mean, at the very least, 
embracing Samuel Beer’s theory of national federalism. The conservative movement is 
dangerously close to his already. Although Beer himself might be considered a liberal, 
his explanation of federalism as constitutional decentralization (with the national people 
as the ultimate sovereign power) is nevertheless incredibly prevalent. This is, in fact, 
most likely a fair description of federalism as it is perceived today, even among 
conservatives. Of course, however, it does mean casting aside the idea of sovereignty 
existing at either the national or the state level. It means that the lines between the state 
and national levels can be redrawn by the sovereign populace, with no prior legal 
principles dictating where they ought to be located. This does not seem like a place where 
conservatism should go. 
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Reversing the change in identity seems like an unfeasible solution as well. The 
development of a national American identity was a natural result of the progression of 
technology. That being the case, it is incredibly doubtful whether such a cultural 
phenomenon could be reversed at all. After all, if human nature caused Americans to 
draw together as a nation, then any attempt to reverse that change would have to fight 
against the nature of mankind itself—a feat that, if not impossible, would be at least 
supremely difficult. Even if it were possible, however, to fracture the culture of the 
United States along geographical boundaries once again, such an outcome would be 
detrimental at best. It was the irreconcilable differences between State cultures that 
caused the Civil War in the first place; splintering American culture once again would 
risk causing a similar result. Additionally, a unified culture has enabled America to act 
and adapt to international developments in a way that would have been impossible in the 
absence of a national identity. 
The only recourse left is for conservatism to adapt to this new “national” political 
identity. Of course, this adaptation could take any number of different forms. Perhaps it 
would entail educating conservatives on the factors affecting their presuppositions. 
Perhaps, however, it involves something else. Samuel Beer’s error, in part, was in resting 
his constitutional decentralization on nothing but the “sovereign will of the people.” The 
Founders drew a line between “internal” and “external” powers, using principles of legal 
reasoning rooted in prior law. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate where the line should be 
drawn. 
Conclusion 
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 American culture has changed. The political identities of Americans have 
changed along with it. The political system of a nation is inextricably linked with those 
identities; when they change, the precise mechanics of the system of government are 
inclined to change with them. However, the underlying principles of that system ought 
never to change. The conservative movement has not recognized the change in its own 
political identity. As a result, it has remained blind to the change within itself—a change 
that has moved conservatism away from the very legal and philosophical battles it 
attempts to fight. As a result, persisting in its current path will eventually cause 
conservatism to destroy the very thing it wishes to protect. 
 That is not to say that conservatism is doomed. Once made aware of the changes, 
it is now possible for conservatism to react to them. The nature and causes of change 
suggest that the movement’s best hope is not to abandon its principles by wholeheartedly 
embracing the change. Nor is it to waste precious resources in a likely futile attempt to 
completely rewind American political identity by over 150 years. Instead, it is time for a 
conversation to start. Conservatism needs to discover what the underlying legal principles 
are that dictate where the lines should be drawn between state and national authority. As 
a matter of law, the Constitution stands supreme. As a matter of philosophy, we ought to 
know what the Constitution ought to stand. The authors of the Constitution thought they 
figured out what was needed in a federal government in 1787. It is time for modern 
conservatives to do the same for our time, or else get swallowed up fighting a war that 
ended a long time ago. 
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